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This paper considers the prospect that the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the 
European Union may have a detrimental effect on its environmental protections. Brexit may 
provide the opportunity to pursue a more environmentally focused agenda, but it is argued 
that the UK’s plan to transpose EU legislation underestimates the complexity of the task and 
that the UK lacks the resources to replicate the system it currently enjoys. On this basis it is 
thought that a reordering of environmental law is more likely than a radical re writing of it.  
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Introduction 
The UK is a sovereign country in Western Europe situated off the north-western coast of the 
European mainland and surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, English Channel 
and the Celtic Sea, giving the UK the twelfth longest coastline in the world.2 Whilst the UK is 
not considered a global biodiversity hotspot, approximately 28% of the UK’s land and 17% of 
its territorial waters are designated important protected areas.3 The UK is a Member State of 
the EU which is a unique economic and political union between 28 European countries.4 What 
began as an economic union has evolved into an organization spanning policy areas from 
climate, environment and health to justice and migration.5 In 2016, the UK voted to leave the 
EU which is scheduled to take effect in March 2019,6 a scenario where no precedent exists. 
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No other country in the history of the EU has sought to recast their relationship in such a 
manner. The environment did not feature highly on either campaign sides prior to Brexit. This 
paper considers two prominent arguments. First, that Brexit presents an opportunity to depart 
from the ‘business as usual’ approach and gives the UK the ability to pursue new, innovative 
and exciting approaches to protecting its environment.7 Secondly, the counter argument that 
Brexit will have a negative impact on the environment and it ‘rips the heart out of environment 
protections’.8 
 
1  Socio-Political Prelude 
Coinciding with Britain re-establishing itself in the world following the decolonisation of its 
empire, its environmental movement began to gain momentum. Influenced by domestic and 
international environmental concerns, it is widely accepted that modern British 
environmentalism began at the beginning of the 1970s,9 a mass movement with the desire to 
defend the natural environment from the excesses of human action began to form.10 
Influenced by a number of high-profile incidents, including the 1952 ‘Great Smog of  London’,11 
the 1957 Windscale nuclear fire,12 and pertinent to this paper; in 1967 the super tanker SS 
Torrey Canyon that ran aground on a reef off the south-west coast of the UK, spilling an 
estimated 25-36 gallons of crude oil. Approximately 50 miles of French and 120 miles of 
Cornish coast were contaminated and some 15,000 sea birds killed as well as significant 
numbers of marine organisms. Additionally, the heavy use of detergents to break up the slick 
caused significant damage. At the time, this was the world’s worst oil spill and remains so in 
UK history.13 The desire to clean up the side effects of industrialisation has now widened to a 
concern for the survival of the planet and the need for an alternative social and economic 
model that dominates much of the word. In the UK, the elite environmental establishment of 
the nineteenth century has progressed into massive memberships of environmentalist 
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organisations including the recent electoral success of the Green Party, the UK’s only major 
political party.14 
 
Brexit is a portmanteau of “British” and “exit” and refers to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
The Environment features very little in the Brexit debate, its omission is suspicious as prior to 
the UK joining the EEC, the UK was widely referred to as the “dirty man of Europe”, with 
reference to the quality of its natural environment.15 When the UK joined it was the only country 
in Western Europe that failed to control pollution from cars, power stations and farming, it also 
tried to undermine EU pesticide controls and evade nitrate regulations and bathing water 
directives.16 Its environmental standards have since improved. In the 1980s the quality of the 
seawater was so poor that the Government claimed that some the UK’s most popular beaches, 
such as Brighton and Blackpool, were not used for bathing in order to avoid dealing with the 
pollution.17 The resulting judgement in Commission v United Kingdom18 found that the UK had 
failed to take all practicable steps to comply with its obligations under Article 4(1) of the Bathing 
Water Directive19 and Articles 5 and 189 of the EEC Treaty. Subsequently, £30 billion was 
invested by water and waste companies over 20 years in addition to enacting EU directives. 
The EU has been a significant source of the UK’s environmental laws influencing its 
environmental policy and direction as set out in the founding treaties. The Single European 
Act 198620 first introduced reference to the environment, further amendments were made 
under the Amsterdam Treaty 199721 which promoted sustainable development and 
environmental integration. Under the Lisbon Treaty 2007,22 the European Union and 
European Community merged into a single European Union establishing the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).23  
 
By the early 1970s, it was accepted internationally that there was a need for some form of 
policy on the protection of the environment. There were two prominent reasons for this 
conclusion: firstly, the interrelationship between economic growth and environmental 
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degradation, and secondly, the environment was emerging as a significant political issue.24 In 
1972, the EU Commission formulated the first action plan on the environment.25 Subsequently, 
this plan has been revised and now the EU has a Sustainable Development Strategy with over 
200 pieces of environmental legislation.26 The strategy prioritises the integration of 
environmental protection requirements into other areas of EU policy, promoting environmental 
protection alongside economic growth and social cohesions as the key aims of the EU.27  
There are four ways in which the EU shapes UK environmental law. Firstly, some items of EU 
legislation are directly enforceable in Member States without any further implementation. 
Secondly, other items of legislation are addressed to Member States and require change in 
domestic legislation. This is often the case with environmental legislation and the use of 
Directives. In these circumstances UK and EU law often differ because EU legislation consists 
of aims, goals and procedural framework rather than precise legal rules like domestic 
legislation. Third, the general policies that underpin the EU help to influence its Members 
States’ attitudes towards policy making decisions. Finally, the economic policies of the EU 
affect the direction of both EU and domestic environmental law. Arguably, that environmental 
protection cannot be isolated from economic policy.28  
 
2  EU Bodies and Enforceability 
The EU has four well-established institutions; the Commission, the Council of the EU, the 
Parliament and the Court of Justice (CJEU). Each has its own powers and duties as set out in 
the TFEU and an obligation to further the aims of the EU. The Commission and the CJEU play 
particularly significant roles in the making and enforcement of EU law. The Commission is the 
executive arm and is responsible for implementing and enforcing EU law,29 drawing up 
environmental action programmes and drafts proposing EU legislation.30 It has been 
described as having an ambivalent nature but academics argue this must be appreciated,31 it 
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is often the driving force behind new environmental policies and is responsible for enforcing 
the economic and other aims of the EU as demonstrated in the Danish bottles case.32  
 
The CJEU consists of judges appointed by common agreement of the Member States. It has 
supreme authority on matters of EU law meaning it has ultimate power to interpret the treaties 
and EU legislation. If required it can review the legitimacy of the actions of the other 
institutions, provide answers on matters of EU law to Member States’ courts, and declare 
whether Member States are implementing EU law poorly. Larion considers the CJEU is a 
positive force when it comes to environmental law, arguing that it interprets EU environmental 
Directives purposively, as much according to the spirit of their environmental objectives as to 
the letter of the law.33 Critics note that whilst the EU has been taking a more proactive role in 
enforcing its environmental law recently, there is strong evidence of a continuing culture within 
the higher tiers of the Commission of hostility towards what is viewed as overzealous 
enforcement.34 The CJEU remains the final decision maker as to whether or not there has 
been compliance and if the Member State has breached EU Law though states normally 
comply as a matter of political necessity. Article 260 provides the Commission with the power 
to impose financial penalties on Member States if it considers they have not complied with a 
judgement of the court. Proponents argue that the likelihood of proceedings under Article 260 
helps to encourage national decision makers and their treasuries to comply with decisions.35           
 
3 EU Environment Law  
It is difficult to deny that the EU has not had a significant impact on the UK’s environmental 
policy and law. EU environmental law is given effect in UK domestic law by the European 
Communities Act 1972. Section 2 requires that Environmental Directives must be transposed 
into domestic legislation which is normally achieved through regulations and sometimes by 
Acts of Parliament.36 Occasionally, directives have resulted in more stringent domestic 
legislation as seen in the standards adopted with air quality, emissions from cars and bathing 
waters.37 Lee warns against holding a nostalgic view of EU environmental law as it may prove 
unhelpful when moving forward with the task of ordering environmental law post-Brexit.38 It 
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should not be thought of as an ideal body of law for environmental protection because the 
environmental laws are as much driven by economic as by environmentalist agendas.39 The 
majority of EU environmental laws were shaped following the drive for the single market, which 
under the Single European Act 1987 introduced a new environmental title and more formal 
legislative competence on environmental matters. The EU Commission has confirmed that the 
effective implementation of EU environmental law helps to “create a level playing field”.40 
Recognising the market-based origins of the EU environmental regulations is not to deny the 
underpinning benefits of integration of environmental policy, especially when faced with 
transboundary and global environmental impacts.  
 
Much of the momentum behind environmental policy was support for common standards in a 
functioning single market where goods and services are traded freely including nationally 
based environmental standards that if set too low or too high,41 may produce market 
fragmentation or trade barriers.42 Academics argue that the market orientated bases for much 
EU environmental law helps in part to explain certain environmental preferences such as why 
EU environmental law has concerned itself with elaborate definitions of waste seeking to 
differentiate waste materials from goods as the latter should be able to cross border freely 
whereas the former, under the proximity principle, should not.43 This helps to explain the 
presence of many EU environmental targets such as the diversification away from landfill or 
for renewables in the energy mix. Bell argues that to an extent landfilling of waste represents 
a low-cost management option or assists a competitive market if the pace of regulated change 
is approximated across all Member States.44 Such outcomes may achieve desirable ends, 
such as the utilization of secondary materials or the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 
but these environmental goals may be hindered by the complexities of harmonisation.45 
 
Academics suggest that the economic liberalisation philosophy that underpins the single 
market can also be seen in The Europe 2020 strategy which sets goals for greenhouse gas 
reductions, energy efficiency gains and renewables in the energy mix. Its key priority is to 
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deliver growth.46 This carbon economy approach is indicative of environmental reductionism, 
in setting aside other wider considerations of environmental degradation it implies that 
environmental issues are largely justifiable by reference to decarbonisation. Jackson suggests 
that the EU’s preoccupation with sustainable growth has seemingly denied any point at which 
growth can be restricted by the capacity of ecosystems or the finite nature of natural 
resources.47 Arguing that pursuing growth implies a top down managed European economy 
as reflected in the economic reform strategies of 2000 and 2010,48  whereas it has long been 
claimed that sustainable development must take account of and include bottom up, grassroots 
participation, described to be ‘crucial’49 to secure cooperation and ensure the effective 
management of locally based resources. It took over 20 years of campaigning against the 
centralised regulation of GM organisms in Europe to secure an acceptance that Member 
States could adopt opt-out measures restricting or prohibiting the cultivation of GM crops50 
providing a clear indication of how difficult it is for that grassroots voice to make itself heard.  
 
3  Legal Challenges  
A ‘hard’ Brexit, in which the UK leaves the EU with no formally recast legal relationship and in 
the absence of any transitional arrangement is most likely. The UK will then attempt to 
negotiate bilateral trade agreements with both the EU and other countries and in the interim, 
may continue to operate under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. Sabine warns that 
under these circumstances the impact on environmental law may be negative.51 Whilst 
bilateral trade agreements are likely to contain provisions on the environment which may 
prevent the reduction of environmental standards, in order to gain a competitive advantage, 
an early UK bilateral deal with the current US administration may not set any exacting 
standard, especially on climate change regulation. It is likely that any bilateral agreement with 
the EU may require the retention of the level environmental playing field that is already in 
place. However, agreements with other countries such as India and China may stipulate 
demands that could impact the environment, such as demands to end agricultural subsidiary 
in the UK farming industry. MacMillan posits that if the UK’s trading relationships are 
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conducted under WTO rules, historically there has been a tendency to interpret these rules so 
as to give primacy to trade over environment.52 Whilst dispute settlements within the WTO 
framework has shown greater consciousness of environmental protection over time, the WTO 
itself has done little to promote environmental standards53.  
 
Whilst elements of a ‘hard’ Brexit are speculation, at the time of writing little is known about 
how the future relationship with the EU will work or what it will look like. This paper in large 
part has resisted speculating and has attempted to focus on certainties. One known certainty 
is the legislation that the UK proposes to use for the main transition is the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19. The Bill will be responsible for repealing the European Communities 
Act 1972 and incorporating existing EU law into domestic law. With no precedent to follow, the 
task of transitioning out of the EU is complex and has wide-ranging implications for the 
movement of goods and people, citizens’ rights and environmental protections and standards. 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has confirmed that there 
are over 1,101 core pieces of directly applicable EU and national implementing legislation 
identified within the department’s remit,54 the complexity and its interlinking nature has 
attracted considerable criticism. This includes but is not exclusive to; the proposed use of 
Henry VIII powers enabling primary legislation to be amended by secondary legislation,55 the 
potential loss of environmental principles and accountability, and an anticipated governance 
gap. The Government have confirmed that approximately one third of existing environmental 
law will be difficult to transfer and will require new legislation or mechanisms for 
implementation.56 One item of legislation that will not be transposed into domestic is law is 
Article 191(2) TFEU which states that policies on the environment shall be based on the 
principle that environmental damage should be rectified at source and that the polluter should 
pay.57 These key principles have been given legal effect in EU law but they are not 
freestanding principles that can be invoked independently but they have provided significant 
leverage for the CJEU in how it interprets EU environmental legislation.58 
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Precautionary Principle  
The formal origin of the precautionary principle can be traced back to Germany in the 1970s 
with its ‘Foresight’ Principle.59 It is a philosophical approach to risk prevention and good 
environmental management in taking proactive measures against specific environmental 
hazards in order to avoid or reduce environmental risks60 and has been adopted by numerous 
sources of international law.61 Based on the idea that the environment is unowned, the 
principle creates an obligation forcing those who want to build or develop to prove in law that 
what they are doing will not damage the environment. The leading case is Pfizer v. European 
Commission [2002]62 where the court banned the use of antibiotics as additives in animal 
foodstuffs on the grounds there was a risk of increased resistance to them in animals and that 
such resistance could be transmitted to humans through consumption. Pfizer sought to 
challenge the Regulation on the grounds there had been an unlawful application of the 
precautionary principle arguing that a scientific assessment of risk was a condition precedent 
of the application of the precautionary principle and that no proper assessment had been 
carried out. Alternatively, had a risk assessment been carried out Pfizer would have argued 
for a much higher standard of proof than had been accepted by the European Commission.  
 
Despite popular support for the principle there are a number of criticisms. Firstly, that the 
principle is ill-defined and that ambiguous terms such as ‘irreversible harm’ or ‘lack of full 
scientific certainty’ undermine legal certainty and produce inconsistent and unprincipled 
decisions.63  However, it is argued that the inconsistency is not caused by the principle itself, 
but by its application.64 Following a review of EU cases which invoked the principle, academics 
suggested that the decision on whether or not to apply the precautionary principle in EU law 
can be unclear,65 but that in comparison with the conventional risk assessment it is no more 
immune to manipulation than other decision principles. The precautionary principle rather than 
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being understood as a precise formula should be considered a flexible principle that helps 
assess scientific uncertainty.66  
 
The second common argument concerns ‘strong’ interpretations of the principle. Critics argue 
that the principle is anti-scientific and stifles innovation on the basis that it is never possible to 
eliminate risk altogether and that there is no such thing as a zero-risk activity. An associated 
fear is that overly precautionary decision-making will discourage investment in technological 
development.67 Proponents counter that the principle is routinely misunderstood by critics to 
mean ‘excessive’ regulation rather than precautionary; applying the principle does not 
necessarily mean more stringent or costly regulation as it could be used to ensure better 
processes of decision-making rather than a particular outcome.68 Had the precautionary 
principle been applied in certain situations, such as to limit the use of specific habitat damaging 
antifouling agents in paints for ships and boats, environmental harm could have been 
avoided.69 Similarly, following historical studies, some academics have concluded that a more 
precautionary response was necessary to manage human exposure to substances such as 
asbestos.70 
 
Critics underline that the UK’s approach to implementing the principle has been problematic 
and at times has only been implemented as a last resort because of public pressure.71 Tahmaz 
suggests that the government’s handling of organophosphorus pesticides (OPs) was overly 
influenced by industry pressure and failed to take a precautionary approach.72 OPs were 
commonly used in sheep dips to control skin parasites during the 1980s when approximately 
40 million sheep were treated once or twice a year.  Farmers who were exposed to OPs during 
handling or spraying of the chemicals complained they suffered health problems including 
headaches, flu-like symptoms, blurred vision, short-term memory loss and confusion. Despite 
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pressure from farmers, the government did not invoke the precautionary principle and, 
therefore did not ban Ops.73 Three government committees advised that there were no proven 
health risks from low exposure to OPs, the government took the view that banning OPs could 
lead to the use of other substances that could harm water quality within rivers thereby failing 
to take the precautionary principle into account.74 
 
In contrast, the government’s handling of legislating for Genetically Modified (GM) crops 
displayed a strong precautionary approach and was influenced by public opinion, EU policy, 
and the scientific community. The government viewed GM crops as a potential new market 
and with early research showing no hazards was happy to legislate for their use. However, 
the government’s position changed due to public opposition and EU policy which had adopted 
a stronger precautionary approach.75 GM crops generated negative public opinion and in 1998 
the EU operated an unofficial moratorium on new approvals of GM products. Concerns 
included whether GM crops such as plants resistant to insect pests, might escape into wild 
populations and impact negatively on biodiversity and concerns of the potential impacts on 
human health. In response the government delayed development of GM food crops until field 
trials had been completed and formed a Cabinet Committee76 on Biotechnology to initiate 
public debate on genetic modification. The scientific review concluded that there was no 
evidence for banning GM crops and that approval of products should be considered on a case-
by-case basis.77 These two contrasting cases show that the UK’s approach is based on 
pragmatism and carefully reflects the circumstances of each case.78 
 
Polluter Pays Principle  
The polluter pays principle is the commonly accepted practice that those who produce 
pollution should bear the cost of managing it in order to prevent damage to the environment. 
This principle has been adopted internationally79 with the most recent incarnation in Article 8 
of the Draft Global Pact for the Environment.80 
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It is suggested that if Brexit is an opportunity to enhance the UK environmental laws then an 
approach similar to that of Trinidad and Tobago’s permitting system may have its merits post-
Brexit. The principle is first referred to in the primary legislative Act.81 Secondly, the National 
Environment Policy82 invokes the policy directly and requires charges to be applied when 
applications are made for licences or permits to pollute. Money collected is then used to 
correct the environmental damage caused by the activity. In Fishermen & Friends of the Sea 
v The Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment (Trinidad and Tobago) [2017]83 the 
court was asked to consider whether local regulations, which set a fixed annual permit fee that 
was based on the total cost to the Minister of issuing the permits were consistent with National 
Environment Policy. The rationale for the regulations was to spread the cost of pollution onto 
those who sought to pollute with the proviso they could continue to operate providing they paid 
their fees. The court found the system to be unlawful and that any system which does not 
make the greater polluter pay more than the lesser polluters favours the rush to the bottom. 
The key in this case was that the principle was contained in the primary legislation and 
therefore enforceable.84  
 
The House of Commons has voted against the amendment Clause 67 of the EU Withdrawal 
Bill; the purpose of this clause was to ensure that the environmental principles discussed 
would continue to apply post-Brexit. The government has pledged environmental standards 
will be enhanced and that the TFEU principles are already central to the UK’s environmental 
policy. In order to ensure these principles continue to underpin policy making it has proposed 
that they are included in a new policy statement.85 This has given rise to a number of criticisms. 
Firstly, the interpretation of the precautionary principle used by the government falls short of 
what the majority of subject experts would understand it as mandating.86.The Secretary of 
State in oral evidence claimed that the principle required a solid body of evidence before it 
can be invoked.87 This statement implies the policy must always be evidence based, however 
the purpose of the precautionary principle is for cases where there is insufficient evidence for 
an evidence-based policy to operate.  
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Secondly, the protections and legal standing offered by the principles being included in a policy 
statement will be significantly weakened and will not be a legally binding mandate.88  It has 
been suggested that the principles could be included in a statutory instrument, similar to the 
embedding of environmental principles as part of the domestic permitting system.89      
 
4 Accountability and Governance 
Critics caution that Brexit will result in a loss of environmental standards and that seeking to 
rely exclusively on domestic mechanisms of accountability will expose gaps in governance.  
EU law imposes a framework of planning and reporting obligations on Member States, 
requiring them to plan the implementation of their environmental obligations. These plans, 
including explanations for failures to comply and use of lawful derogations are public 
documents and are sent to the EU Commission. The nature of environmental obligations 
means they are set in the future and rarely definitively met, making them an ongoing 
commitment. Planning for compliance helps to make environmental obligations a current 
priority for governments and helps to ensure accountability is not cast into the future and it is 
not necessary to wait for the outcome to be breached and any risk of a breach becomes 
transparent.90 The seriousness with which governments may take these requirements may fall 
short but these obligations underpin our understanding of whether the government is doing 
what it said it would and provides accountability.91    
 
The Government’s assertion that judicial review can provide the exclusive mechanism for 
challenging the application of environmental legislation post-Brexit is misleading.92 The House 
of Lords European Union Committee concluded that this misunderstands both the breadth of 
the functions performed by EU institutions and limitations of judicial review.93 Critics of the 
government’s plan have argued that judicial review remains a very limited mechanism of 
accountability and is not suited to the government’s proposal for the following reasons. First, 
judicial review is dependent on priorities of society, and their willingness and capacity to act. 
Secondly, it is costly and risky, especially given the limited access to the justice system. Third, 
UK courts do not involve themselves in ‘merit’ reviews and instead consider the legality of a 
                                                     
88 Papworth, N., Constitutional and Administrative Law, (2016, 9th Edition, Oxford University Press) 
318.  
89 McNamee, P., Greener UK, Ensuring the Withdrawal Bill Leads to a Greener UK Parliamentary 
Briefing (2017). 
90 Lee, M., ‘Accountability for Environmental Standards after Brexit’, (2017) Environmental Law 
Review 19 (2) 89-92.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Douglas-Scott, S., ‘Brexit, Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution’, (2016) Modern Law 
Review 79 (6) 1019-1040.  
93 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Brexit: Environment and Climate Change, (2017) HL 
Paper 109. 




decision,94 in comparison the CJEU considers the application of the law. Fourthly, as seen in 
the first ClientEarth95case UK courts can be highly respectful of the government, allowing wide 
discretion on questions of economic or political sensitivity. It is suggested that EU law has 
consistently rejected attempts to rely on practical, political or economic difficulties to excuse a 
breach; as seen in Commission v UK (Bathing Waters).96 Finally, remedies are discretionary 
in domestic judicial review.  
 
Environmental protection is dependent on robust governance but existing UK institutions lack 
the resources, expertise, power and the independence needed to hold central government to 
account.97 Domestic agencies have important roles in enforcing and protecting the 
environment but lack the independence from central government to hold them to account.98 
Whilst they can provide specialist expertise and advice they must be subject to external 
scrutiny. As regulators they cannot both police and regulate their own activities and powers.  
An example of this is the allowed damaging practices of burning blanket bogs within English 
Special Areas of Conversation without the appropriate assessment required by the Habitats 
Directive. The EU Commission is now taking steps that will require UK authorities to address 
this issue,99 failure to do so may result in a referral to the CJEU.100   
 
Arguably, political accountability is not adequate either. Parliament through its Select 
Committees can scrutinise government action and introduce new legislation if laws are not 
enforced or are ineffective, but they do not have the relevant scientific or technical expertise, 
or the sufficient time or capacity to fill the expected governance gap, nor are they completely 
independent of the executive.101 Parliaments that are sensitive to short term political needs 
are not best placed to assess the long-term effects of a failure to implement environmental 
law.102 Finally, political accountability is distinct from legal oversight.  
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To further complicate matters, legislative competence on the environment is widely devolved, 
making it difficult for central government to bring a UK wide perspective to environmental law 
post-Brexit. In Miller103 the court found the statutory assurances given by the UK government 
with regards to legislating on devolved matters without the consent of the devolved 
governments to be non-justiciable, finding that the purpose of such legislation was to do no 
more than entrench a constitutional convention suggesting that the conventions are sustained 
because the consequences for violating them would ‘political difficulties’ for those involved.104   
 
Considering the varying degrees of enthusiasm for Brexit across the devolved administrations 
it is plausible that several pathways may open up. The progress made in Scotland under Part 
3 of the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 in reshaping Scots environmental law or the 
repurposing of Welsh environmental law along the lines of sustainable natural resource 
management105 may be evidence of these pathways already existing. One function of EU law 
was to produce a broadly harmonised UK environmental law but, with that discipline 
withdrawn, and given the different ambitions of the devolved administrations, academics 
suggest that a fragmented body of UK environmental law may emerge.  
 
5 Post-Brexit 
The imperfect, but adequate independence of the EU Commission and CJEU with respect to 
scrutiny and enforcement is a result at least in part of the mutual interests of the 28 Member 
States in supervising each other, and so in part empowering these bodies.106 Post-Brexit these 
enforcement functions will be lost. The government has acknowledged that a new public body 
may be necessary. Lee suggests it will need to be adequately independent, expert and 
resourced to hold government to account.107 It should be able to report; publicly and to 
parliaments, in response to plans and reports received from the executive. The new body 
should be able to undertake investigations on its own initiative, ensuring a strategic approach 
to governance is taken.108 Additionally, the new body will be able to address defined categories 
of complaints from individuals and non-profit organisations as does the European 
Commission, without charge or formality. The UKLEA suggest that the new body should have 
the power to demand remedial action, ranging from fresh plans and reports, to compensatory 
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measures.109  The power to bring ordinary judicial review actions against government when 
appropriate would further enhance effectiveness.  
 
Marine Environment  
The European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1970s first developed directives and 
regulations reacting to specific sectorial activities causing problems in the marine 
environment, such as pollution. Post 2000, EU directives have taken on a more holistic nature, 
adopting framework directives and addressing global issues such as climate change.110 Since 
2008 there have been fewer major proposals by the Commission, instead the focus has been 
on reviewing existing legislation and where necessary filling gaps in protection while ensuring 
that the environment can deliver economic benefits.111 Subsequently, the approach has been 
to manage issues affecting the marine environment in a holistic manner, using the ecosystem 
approach and encouraging Member States to work together to address transboundary issues. 
There is a plethora of administrative bodies required to implement these governance 
instruments most notably any maritime state which has the overall aim, as in the UK, of 
ensuring a vision of ‘clean, safe, healthy, biologically diverse and productive seas and 
oceans’112 requires the appropriate instruments covering all users and uses of the seas. The 
range of marine uses and users all need to be controlled in order to prevent marine 
deterioration, hence the amount of legislation.113  
 
International Agreements  
Post-Brexit the UK will continue its role as a signatory to international agreements such as the 
Regional Sea Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic 1992 (OSPAR). OSPAR has played an important role in protecting the UK and wider 
European marine environment. Directives issued by the EU have been the means to adopting 
OSPAR’s recommendations and agreements. The UK is also a signatory of the United Nations 
conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which grants coastal states certain rights, 
responsibilities and obligations. The UK will be required to manage and conserve the 
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resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including fisheries sustainably.114 Under 
UNCLOS and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement the UK will also be responsible for 
cooperating with neighbouring states to sustainably manage shared and trans-boundary fish 
stocks. However, unlike EU law UNCLOS has no means of enforcement and relies on 
signatories’ voluntary compliance.  
 
EEZ and Fisheries Management  
Post-Brexit the UK will be responsible for all aspects of fishing activity and management within 
its sovereign 200-mile EEZ and will become independent of the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), which means all fishing activity will be subject to UK regulations.115 In addition to the 
proposed reintegration of EU legislation, a new UK Fisheries Bill is expected in 2018 that will 
set out the legal framework for controlling access to fisheries and fisheries management. The 
CFP aims to ensure the sustainability of EU fish stocks and fisheries by promoting international 
cooperation, creating fair market competition, setting trade policy, and providing funding to 
support fishers to improve the sustainability of their practices and coastal communities to 
diversify incomes.116 The CFP provides equal access to all EU fishing fleets to EU waters and 
as such EU waters are managed as a single EU EEZ from the 12 nautical mile limit. 
Additionally, it establishes the concept of Relative Stability and total allowable catches as the 
main regulatory tool for fisheries management.117  
 
The UK fishing industry has argued that the CFP unfairly biases the UK in terms of rights and 
that Brexit presents the opportunity to rebalance the distribution of fishing opportunities. 
Analysis shows the extent to which fishing within UK waters favours non-UK fishing interests, 
providing an insight into the overall significance of the seas around the UK to the EU’s fishing 
economy as a whole.118 In 2014, over two thirds of fish by weight and over half by value landed 
within the UK EEZ were taken by non-UK boats. Belgium’s fishing fleet relied most heavily on 
access to UK waters with almost half its total landings sourced therein, and the Netherlands, 
Germany, Denmark and Ireland caught approximately one third or more of their total landings 
within the UK fishing zone. In contrast, only 14% of the UK cache came from within EU waters. 
                                                     
114 Brexit: fisheries inquiry. Government Response. House of Lords, EU Energy and Environment 
Sub-committee. [online] https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-energy-
environment-subcommittee/Brexit-fisheries/Gvt-Response.pdf 
115 Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11th December 
2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy L354/22. 
116 Goti-Aralucea, L., et al., ‘Overarching sustainability objectives incompatible directions in the 
Common Fisheries Policy’, (2018) Marine Policy 91 49-51.  
117 Carpenter, G., et al, ‘Landing the blame: The influence of EU member states on quota setting’, 
(2016) Marine Policy 64 9-15. 
118 Napier, I., ‘Fish Landings from the UK Exclusive Economic Zone and UK Landings from the EU 
EEZ’, (2017) NAFC Marine Centre, University of the Highlands and Islands, Port Arthur.  




Non-UK EU fishing boats therefore landed seven times by weight, and five times by value, 
from the UK EEZ, than UK boats caught from other areas of the EU EEZ.119 
 
Brexit presents an opportunity to develop better integrated, more flexible marine governance 
in UK waters in place of the systemic rigidities of the CFP. The concept has undergone a 
transformation from an antidote to equal access and an assurance that expansion of the EU 
would not prejudice the status of national fishing interests to a mechanism perceived by the 
catching sector as perpetuating the injustices of the original allocation of fishing opportunities 
some 35 years ago. A new system of governance is required that will provide for effective but 
flexible management within the UK EEZ, with a degree of compatibility with neighbouring 
regimes; and the scope for meaningful cooperation over present and future management of 
the wider regional seas. A layered approach starting with a new UK Sea Fisheries Act could 
replace a range of legislation dating from the 1960s and the common rules of the CFP. 
 
The enactment of a new Fisheries Bill outlining the new legal structures, rights and 
responsibilities will provide a first step. The more substantive and detailed task is in the framing 
of a new Sea Fisheries Act that will not only define the mechanisms by which the UK fishing 
industry will be regulated but also set out a regulatory framework that will govern all fishing 
activity within the EEZ.120 The proposed legislation will have many things to balance, but 
amongst the most important are; firstly, the allocation of responsibilities for fisheries 
management between the UK, national administrations and regional or local institutions and 
the implications for a coherent and consistent system of regulation covering both domestic 
and foreign fishing activity. Secondly; the provisions for inclusive and participative governance 
lacking in the CFP and the post-Brexit mechanism for distributing fishing entitlements, 
involving a choice between staying with output restrictions or opting for a change to effort 
limitations in the form of days at sea allocations.121 Finally, and of most importance to this 
paper is that considerations must be given to the balance of objectives and principles that will 
drive the UK’s approach to fisheries management, including the definition and interplay of 
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Marine Governance      
The term marine governance relates to policies, politics, laws and administrations that are for 
the wide adoption of eight internationally recognised principles.123 These are ecologically 
sustainable development, integrational equity; the precautionary principle; Conservation of 
Biological Diversity and ecological integrity; economic valuation of environmental factors; the 
polluter pays principle; waste minimisation, and public participation.124 The resulting marine 
management has to reconcile several wide-ranging topics: the vertical integration of 
governance across geopolitical levels, the horizontal integration across many types of 
stakeholders, the chain of activities leading to pressures and impacts, the risk assessment 
and response to those impacts, the creation of ecosystem services with a potential to deliver 
societal benefits and the Ecosystem Approach.125 The latter essentially being the ability to 
maintain, protect and enhance the natural system, its structure, functioning, health and 
productivity while at the same time deliver the services, goods and benefits required by 
society.126  
 
The UK will no longer be subject to the some of the most important environmental legislation 
including Birds and Habitats, Bathing Water, Water Framework, and Marine Spatial Planning 
Directives as well as the CFP. Critics caution that the health of the wider marine environment 
might degrade should the UK no longer comply with current or future standards.127 Key pieces 
of UK legislation such as the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009 (MCAA) would still be important as they were passed as primary UK Acts of 
Parliament. Post-Brexit new legislation will need to be introduced or reintegrated to manage 
key pressures and activities such as pollution, environmental liability, shipping, invasive 
species, environmental impact assessments, clean water for bathing and drinking, sewage 
and nitrates all of which are primarily managed through EU regulations at present. Critics of 
EU environmental legislation argue that they are often vague in their commitments, 
implementation can be disjointed and fail to meet the holistic aspirations of the legislation.128 
A review of European sourced legislation tasked with identifying if there is any unnecessary 
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regulatory burden, concluded there was room for improvement and recommended that any 
future legislation should be implemented so as not to go beyond the minimum requirements 
set by a directive.129 However, without this legislation, all the discussed components and 
activities would need managing and regulating and so a maritime state would still require the 
elements to cover land and vessel pollution, dredging and aggregate extraction, fisheries and 
mineral exploitation etc. The cross-boundary nature of marine problems will always require 
cross boundary solutions.  
 
Critics argue that post-Brexit the UK will be free from ‘spirit crushing’ environmental 
protection.130 Much of the existing legislation will stay, but with much less rigidity.131 At a 
national level, current sea space management has often led to overregulation and complexity 
which has subsequently led to demand in the industry for governments to minimise the amount 
of legislation to be tackled before development can occur.132 The expanse of marine legislation 
has led to what many have described as ‘uncertain governance’. Nations have struggled to 
keep pace with the amount of EU legislation and have required increasingly competent bodies 
and administrative functions to enact it.133 Critics caution against the UK pursuing a purely 
individual approach to protecting the marine environment, some nations who border regional 
seas have become frustrated that purely national measures cannot influence the activities of 
other countries who also border the same marine area. Regional cooperation poses many 
challenges for the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) implementation, including 
obtaining support for regional outcomes by non-EU nations who are not required to ratify the 
MSFD.134 With that noted, it is possible that should the UK seek a purely individual approach 
to protecting the marine environment it may be frustrated at the lack of cooperation from its 
neighbours? Most notably the EU?  
 
Marine Protected Areas (MPA) 
MPAs are protected areas of seas, oceans and estuaries. MPAs restrict human activity for the 
purposes of conservation, normally to protect marine resources that are of significant 
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importance to the wider ecosystem. It is possible that post-Brexit the UK’s approach to MPAs 
may give a clear indication as to whether Brexit has provided the platform for an enhanced 
environmentally focused approach. Academics suggest that the UK may take one of two 
courses of action with regards to European Marine Sites (EMS). Firstly, de-designate them, 
ending the sites’ status as protected areas, or alternatively re-designate them but with EMS 
occupying over 12% of the UKs seas, the loss of these sites may be catastrophic for the UK’s 
MPA network. These MPAs are designated in areas of the most important habitats and 
species for European biodiversity and wildlife, which are also important to the UK. Given the 
severity and their importance, their protection should be given the highest priority. 
 
In addition to the European Marine Sites, domestically under the Marine and Coastal Access 
Act 2013 the UK has designated 50 Marine Conservation Zones (MCZ) to protect nationally 
important species and habitats not protected by EMS. However, the laws governing MCZs are 
weaker than those that govern the EMS. The regulations protecting EMS from damaging 
activities include that developers, fishers and heavy industries need to show their activities will 
not have adverse effects on the sites before being allowed to proceed are more restrictive 
than those for MCZs. If EMS should be re designated to MCZs then they will have weaker 
protections which would be considered detrimental to the future of the sites. Instead, post-
Brexit the UK could, in addition to keeping the EMS enhance the legal protections for MCZ 
making them equivalent to the legal protections currently afford to EMS.135 In addition to the 
biodiversity and wildlife that would be negatively affected by a change of the MPAs 
stakeholders would also be impacted. As a result of the revised approach to fisheries 
management in EMSs, over 40 domestic laws have been created, restricting the trawling and 
dredging of large number of coastal EMSs.136 Such measures have been controversial, and 
some commercial stakeholders have called for these measures to be repealed post-Brexit 
under the guise of excessive legislation. If these measures are repealed the work and time 
invested by regulators, fishers, environmentalists and central government since 2012 could 
be lost along with the progress made for UK marine conservation. 
 
Conclusion 
When concluding this paper, it should be remembered that Brexit is an ever-evolving process. 
Does Brexit provide the UK with an opportunity to adopt a new generation of more effective 
environmental legislation? The answer to this depends on a number of factors.  
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First. The large amount of EU environmental legislation to be reintegrated into domestic 
legislation is vast, complex and designed to be part of a system, but the argument that it is 
excessive remains elusive. Careful consideration needs to be given to how these will be 
transposed; if not done correctly the UK risks either reducing its protections or creating 
ineffective legislation. Existing domestic legislation will continue to apply as will other forms of 
secondary legislation, which limits the possibility of the UK’s environmental protections 
regressing initially. However, environmental principles transposed by non-legally binding 
policy statements risks reducing the effectiveness of environmental legislation.  
 
Second. Any law without the means of enforcement is largely symbolic and warnings of a 
governance gap opening post-Brexit should not be ignored. Domestic mechanisms have been 
established as being inadequate for holding the government to account on environmental 
matters. Post-Brexit enforcement will either require a significant restructuring of existing 
agencies or a new enforcement body that can hold central government to account but it is 
unlikely that either option will be capable of matching the effectiveness of the EU Commission 
and CJEU. Further complications lie in the power sharing agreements with devolved 
governments and administrations of the UK, the risk of Scotland or Wales wanting to further 
improve (as they have shown willing) on environmental protections poses the possibility of a 
disjointed approach within the UK. However, pressure from the administrations may 
encourage central government to increase its environmental ambitions. 
 
The marine environment is a hotly contested area of Brexit. Marine issues require cross 
boundary solutions. It is for this reason why it is unlikely that the UK will pursue a policy of 
nationalising its fish stocks in its EEZ. It is likely the UK will seek to cooperate with its 
neighbours not only to fulfil its obligations under UNCLOS as well as to secure a financially 
beneficial relationship with trading partners. Warnings that the marine environment and 
biodiversity are at risk if the UK reduces its protections should be taken seriously. It is unlikely 
that the UK will fail to maintain these to the current level thanks to existing legislation. It is 
optimistic, but not beyond the realms of possibility that the UK will increase the protections of 
its MCZs to those of EMSs which would be a positive step in achieving the government’s green 
ambitions.  
 
An optimistic conclusion is that Brexit provides a basis for the UK to adopt a less rigid and 
more flexible environmentally focused attitude, EU law should not be remembered as an ideal 
body of environmental law. Ultimately, its underpinnings are economical yet this ignores the 
economic and social drivers behind the Brexit decision. Brexit was not made with the 
environment at the forefront of the minds of those who cast their vote. EU legislation is not 




without its criticisms, but Brexit does provide a basis for which the UK could take a body of 
highly regarded environmental laws and build on them. A more realistic conclusion is that it is 
unlikely that the UK will depart radically from its current position and standards of 
environmental protections, any changes to environmental legislation are likely to be modest, 
ultimately the environment has become a key topic on the political spectrum, one which cannot 
be ignored. 
